University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1988

Book Review: Feminism Unmodified. by
Catherine Mackinnon; Gender and History. by
Linda J. Nicholson.
Michael Levin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Levin, Michael, "Book Review: Feminism Unmodified. by Catherine Mackinnon; Gender and History. by Linda J. Nicholson." (1988).
Constitutional Commentary. 721.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/721

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

1988]

BOOK REVIEWS

201

FEMINISM UNMODIFIED. By Catherine MacKinnon.1
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. 315.
$25.00.

GENDER AND HISTORY. By Linda J. Nicholson.z New
York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 238.
$27.50.
Michael Levin3

It is an open secret in the academy that academic feminism is
held to standards that are considerably more relaxed than those
governing other forms of scholarship. On the evidence of their presumably peer-reviewed publications, feminists are not expected to
marshall evidence for even their most extraordinary claims, to meet
obvious objections to these claims, to maintain internal consistency,
or even to express themselves clearly enough for the reader to determine precisely what it is that they wish to say. In a grand gesture of
intellectual affirmative action, the predominantly male academic establishment continues to allow feminists to get away with anything.
If this indictment seems too harsh, consider the books under
review, both published by very prestigious university presses. These
books teach nothing, and their authors seem unaware of any aspect
of human experience beyond those discussed in Feminist Studies or
Das Kapital. Each book will be found unreadable by anyone but a
reviewer, whose duty compels him to press on. The turgidity of
Professor Linda Nicholson's prose gives new force to the insult
"written like a dissertation." Here for instance is a passage about
the slogan "the personal is political":
The slogan provides, I believe, an important clue to understanding the significance of the contemporary women's movement and marks it as unique as a political
movement. This uniqueness is reflected not only within the political practice.
Rather I wish to argue, and this will be a central argument of this book, that the
theory which is currently being developed by those active in the contemporary women's movement represents a comparably unique contribution to existing political
theory. The attention contemporary feminist practice has given to gender relations
and the family is reflected within feminist theory in the study of both as necessary
components of political theory. The consequence, I intend to show, carries serious
implications for existing political theory.
I. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2. Associate Professor in Women's Studies and Philosophy of Education, State University of New York, Albany.
3. Professor of Philosophy, City College of New York and the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York.
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And here is Professor Nicholson explaining why appeal to
biology "prevents us from understanding the family in historical
perspective":
Such a dehistoricization is fatal for comprehending gender. since it is importantly
through understanding the history of the family and its relation to nonfamilial institutions as well as the prehistory of the family in institutions of kinship, that we will
be able to comprehend that history of gender which has brought us to our present.
Moreover, such a biologization of the modern family serves to freeze those gender
relations expressed in it, to conceptualize them also as grounded in biology.

Professor Catherine MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified is not
lifeless, but its animus against men and heterosexuality will quickly
tire anyone who does not share MacKinnon's obsessions. There
was, apparently, no editor at Harvard University Press with the
gumption to delete her many snarling references to fucking and
coming,4 or her query, "Who listens to a woman with a penis in her
mouth?"
The deference of male academics to feminist excess may be
partly due to misplaced chivalry and an understandable reluctance
to provoke further feminist anger, but it derives primarily from
guilt about the massive oppression supposedly suffered by women.
Naturally enough, this serviceable idea is the exclusive theme of
Gender and History and Feminism Unmodified, as it is of every feminist word and thought.
Professor Nicholson takes the universal oppression of women
as a given. Without attempting to offer any evidence that women
are oppressed, she sets out to explain why they are, unconcerned
that explanations of what isn't so are devoid of interest. If women's
oppression is wholly or partly a myth, then to that extent Nicholson
might as well be telling us why the Earth is square or how Napoleon won the battle of Waterloo. She obscures this difficulty by
identifying the oppression of women with "patriarchy," the male's
predominance in all extrafamilial roles and his traditional role as
final arbiter within the family. Patriarchy is a fact, and one demanding explanation. "Oppression," however, is not the only plausible explanation of patriarchy. If men run most things wholly or
partly because men on average want to run things more intensely
than do women-if patriarchy reflects the innate preferences of
both men and women-then to that extent patriarchy is not oppres4. For instance: "I would like to address a question ... : whether a good fuck is any
compensation for getting fucked"; "Rape is defined by distinction from intercourse--not
nonviolence, intercourse. They ask, does this event look more like fucking or like rape?";
"Abortion offers women the liberal feminist dream of being real women-that is available to
being freely fucked"; "Women in pornography, when you tickle us, we get turned on; when
you scratch us, we start to come; when you kill us, we orgasm until death."
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sive.s (Nicholson further compounds the confusion by identifying
patriarchy with the "devaluation of women.")
But Professor Nicholson's most egregious error, one that
would vitiate her book no matter how meticulous the rest of her
argument, is her explicit rejection of scientific method. If women
have been oppressed in every society, it is natural to posit some
single factor responsible for this universal phenomenon. That similar effects must be presumed to have similar causes is the guiding
principle of science. It would be an astonishing coincidence if hundreds of distinct processes all somehow produced the same result,
male dominance, in each of hundreds of different societies. Yet that
is precisely what Nicholson would have us accept. In place of "a
positivist methodology" she offers "the historical-hermeneutical
tradition," which "rejects that model of scientific explanation which
searches for similar causes to [sic] similar effects."6 What is to be
sought instead is the "meaning" of women's oppression in each
society:
But, as female devaluation is not one fact but many, interlinked with specificities of
culture, so also should we abandon the search for one cross-cultural cause .... To
analyze the origins of female devaluation, we may need to construct more than one
story.

At her most adventurous, Nicholson comes close to abandoning the
idea of causation altogether: "To think about origins historically
means rejecting the equation of origins with cause."7
It is unfortunate that Nicholson discusses the causal issue only
in connection with Marxist efforts to provide a unified explanation
of sex roles in terms of private property. Since Marxism cannot
5. People are "oppressed" when forced by others to do what they do not want to do.
Some feminists allow that women under patriarchy do what they want to do, but claim that
women are oppressed because their wants are "inauthentic" products of sexist conditioning.
This view clearly assumes that no preferences, male or female, are innate. Betty Friedan
concedes that female preferences may have something to do with innate female physiology,
but argues that if this is so women are oppressed by their own preferences. Such a view
requires an incoherent distinction between a person and his desires, for it construes a person's
desires as external forces compelling him to do what he does not want to do.
6. Despite her animadversions against it, Professor Nicholson appears not to know
what "positivist methodology" is. Positivism is not especially concerned with Occam's Razor, linear causation, or determinism (what Professor Nicholson calls "determinacy"). Positivism is distinguished by its concern that hypotheses be empirically testable.
7. Nicholson flirts with rejecting "the search for 'origins'" as well, and approvingly
cites this sentence from Michelle Rosaldo: "But asking 'Why?' or 'How did it begin?' appears
inevitably to run our thoughts from an account of the significance of gender for the organization of all human institutional forms (and, reciprocally, of the significance of all social facts to
gender) toward dichotomous assumptions that link the roles of men and women to the different things that they, as individuals, are apt to do-things which for women in particular, are
all too readily explained by the apparently primordial and unchanging facts of sexual
physiology."
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provide a convincing explanation of anything, Nicholson is able to
persuade herself that a unified explanation is unimportant. But, to
repeat, that view is tantamount to a rejection of science. Once one
seeks a single cause for the anthropological constant of male dominance, it becomes apparent that this cause cannot be a social factor
unless it is one that somehow arises everywhere and in every era.
Hunger, for example, is such a factor, but hunger is biological. One
must therefore consider the possibility of a biological universal of
some sort-at the very least, the innately greater physical strength
of men. Feminists recognize this, but they are unwilling to make
even the most minimal and obvious concessions to the reality of
innate differences between the sexes. That is why they loathe biology as Dracula does the sun.
The only biological universal Professor Nicholson considers
even momentarily is motherhood. As she puts it,
There is nothing itself problematic in the claim that in all human societies women
bear children. That might be treated equivalently to the claim that in all human
societies women and men urinate. 8

Predictably, however, she is not impressed by motherhood.
If we abstract from our own nuclear family, where individual women are often
dependent on individual men, to different family forms with different divisions of
labor, then it is easy to see that a pregnant or lactating woman need be no more
dependent on a larger social group than any other member of that group. . . .
[Moreover,] an individual woman could be dependent on other nonchildbearing
females.

Even at this absurdly simplistic level, her reasoning is patently
inadequate. Apart from the silliness of positing "different family
forms" in a world which has yet to see stable arrangements that do
not involve pairing mothers with individual men, the fact is that
women are not as capable of abandoning their children as men are.
Research on the physiology of bonding has confirmed the commonsense observation that profound hormonal changes within the
mother cement her attachment to her newbom.9 In any case, the
principal biological factors determining social structure are, in addition to those involving motherhood per se, the great number that
8. Many other bodily functions, such as breathing, are equally apt for the comparison
Professor Nicholson wishes to make. A hermeneutical focus on close readings and hidden
subtexts would doubtless deconstruct Gender and History to reveal deep hostility to motherhood, children, and sexual relations between men and women.
9. See Persky, Reproductive Hormones, Moods, and the Menstrual Cycle, in SEX DIF·
FERENCES IN BEHAVIOR 455 (R. Friedman, R. Richart & R. Vande Wiele eds. 1974). There
are obviously good evolutionary reasons for the emergence of bonding mechanisms. It is also
obvious that professors of Women's Studies should be acquainted with the scientific literature
on these mechanisms, and that some referee for Columbia University Press should have insisted that Professor Nicholson consult it.
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produce sex differences in motivation and cognition.w The prenatal
exposure of the mammalian male brain to androgens alters those
regions of the brain associated with characteristically male aggressive behavior. Human females exposed to androgens in utero develop masculine personalities rather than the feminine personalities
associated with female socialization. It is becoming similarly evident that males enjoy an innate advantage in abstract mathematical
skills while females enjoy an advantage in verbal skills; recently observed physical differences between the male and female brain, particularly the greater attenuation of the corpus callosum in adult
females, seem implicated in these differences. In short, the fundamentals of gender are not "socially constructed." History sheds no
light whatsoever on the male advantage in dominance-aggression,
although the contingencies of culture obviously influence the specific manifestations of this and other innate tendencies. When Professor Nicholson wanted to know why public affairs are associated
with men, and thence with "reason," she should have looked to biology. It was inexcusable for Columbia University Press to publish
a study of gender and history by an author either ignorant of the
research described or ideologically committed to ignoring it.
Perhaps because Nicholson spends so much time saying what
she is going to say and saying what she has said, her actual
message-her specific account of what history teaches about gender-is extremely thin. As I understand her, she wishes to deny
that the family is a "natural" institution which creates a "private"
sphere that is disjoint from the "public" sphere in every society.
She contends instead that there have been societies without the family; that the family has only recently evolved out of kinship relations; that, consequently, the line between public and private is an
"abstraction" not corresponding to any social reality; and finally,
that relegating women's activities to the "private" sphere mystifies
"the realities of women's lives," in particular their devaluation.
Nicholson does not-because she cannot-offer any anthropological evidence for her astonishing denial of the universality of the
family. She relies instead upon rhetorical ploys that are as transparent as they are ubiquitous in feminist writing. One ploy is to confine
her citations to the writings of other feminists. 11 The second is reliance on the work of Philippe Aries, who Nicholson interprets as
10. For a discussion of some of this research, see M. LEVI!", FEMINISM AND FREEDOM
ch. 4 (1987).
II. "Those who have most explicitly endorsed this position ... [that) the relation between 'private' and 'public' is historically changing ... have been socialist feminists ....
Thus much of the theory and scholarship I shall draw on in this book will be from the
writings of socialist feminists."
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maintaining "that the concept of the family was unknown in the
Middle Ages and only originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." Of course, it turns out that Aries maintains no such thing;
his point, rather, is that "the family existed in silence; it did not
awaken feelings strong enough to inspire poet or artist." Whether
this is or is not so-and Aries seems not to know that the Holy
Family was a dominant theme in medieval art-it hardly implies
that there were no families. Third, Nicholson stresses the distinction between the biologically fixed but quite extensive network of
kinship relations, and the more specific triad of mother, father, and
child. This enables her to gloss over the fact that the reproductive
triad forms the biological and social backbone of any more extensive kinship structure. No matter how many sisters and cousins and
aunts are reckoned up, the identity of the mother and father of a
child is always firm, and it is upon them that primary responsibility
for raising the child has always fallen in every society. A fourth and
related tactic is to stress historical variations in family arrangements
as if they nullify perennial constancies. The contemporary urban
apartment, miles from the father's workplace and seldom accommodating grandparents or aunts, differs greatly from a medieval
farmhouse. Yet mother and father were as clearly recognized in the
farmhouse as they are in the apartment.
Both of our authors use a disarming ploy which might be
called "refutation by explicit statement." It involves creating the
impression that a devastating objection has been answered by stating the objection clearly and then moving on. Nicholson deploys
this device most boldly against Locke's contention that the state
cannot be justified by analogy to the family because the family and
the state serve different functions. She begins by paraphrasing
Locke's point fairly:
Since the early modern period it has been widely believed that the needs which
motivate individuals to become members of families are of a fundamentally different
nature from the needs which motivate families to unite into states. The basic
human needs which have been thought to motivate the creation of families typically
include intimacy, affection, sexuality, and mutual care and support.

If Locke is right, of course, the distinction between family and state
is decidedly natural. Nicholson rejects this view, yet makes no effort to rebut it. Perhaps she believes its naked sexism suffices to
repel right-minded readers. Perhaps she hopes to bluff the reader.
In any event, what follows is an astonishing discussion of Locke's
criticism of Robert Filmer, who defended the divine right of kings.
Professor Nicholson does not quite side with Filmer against Locke,
but she finds Filmer's comparison of kings with fathers to be sensi-
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tive to "the unity of kinship and politics." Filmer erred, according
to Nicholson, only in anachronistically projecting this union, which
was "once real" (before "lords had become replaced by fathers and
kings"), into modern times. Locke did much more damage by
blindly "reifying" state and family, time-bound features of his own
era, thus "eliminat[ing] appeals to the past as relevant for political
analysis." This is why "radical feminism might be seen as the contemporary rejoinder to a view of social organization first importantly articulated by Locke." You have to go pretty far in 1987 to
find a sympathetic word for the divine right of kings, but it's there
in Gender and History.
Of course, Locke's liberalism is anathema to feminists. Feminist social reforms require a totalitarian invasion of private life by
the coercive agency of the state. As Professor Nicholson delicately
puts it, even mild, moderate "liberal" feminism will require "a restructuring of the public." 12 This invasion becomes more tolerable,
of course, if one is convinced that there really is no private sphere to
begin with. Moreover, since sex roles are most strongly reinforced
within the family, admitting that the family is a realm of autonomy
amounts to admitting that sex roles reflect basic human preferences,
an admission spelling the end of feminist ideology. Joining an
overly broad definition of politics as the allocation of power to their
axiom that private life is a male excuse for overpowering women,
feminists naturally consider private life "political."
Animosity toward individual freedom reaches pathological intensity in Feminism Unmodified. Mere mention of the Bill of
Rights is enough to drive Professor MacKinnon into a fury:
The theory of the First Amendment under which most pornography is protected from government restriction proceeds from liberal assumptions that do not
apply to the situation of women. First Amendment theory, like virtually all liberal
legal theory, presumes the validity of the distinction between public and private
. . . . The problem is that not only the public but also the private is a "sphere of
social power" of sexism. . . . The distinction between public and private does not
cut the same for women as for men. It is men's right to inflict pornography upon
women in private that is protected.

And not just pornography. There is also rape, wife-beating, and
assault on children. In Professor MacKinnon's world, 44% of all
women are victims of rape or attempted rape, "not counting in their
marriage"; 14% of married women have been raped by their husbands; 92.2% of all women are sexually assaulted or harassed; anywhere from 25% to 70% of women experience serious violence in
12.

That feminism is necessarily coercive and totalitarian is the central theme of my

FEMINISM AND FREEDOM.
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the home; 48% of children are sexually assaulted; 17.5% of all females under 18 suffer incest at the hands of male family members.
All men think like rapists: "Recent experimental research . . .
makes normal men more closely resemble convicted rapists attitudinally, although as a group they don't look all that different from
them to start with."B Even Roe v. Wade is part of the problem.
Roe may have saved women from a "desperate situation," namely
pregnancy as a result of "intercourse under conditions of gender
inequality,"'4 but
When the law of privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy, it bars change in
control over that intimacy. The existing distribution of power and resources within
the private sphere will be precisely what the law of privacy exists to protect. It is
probably not coincidence that the very things feminism regards as central to the
subjection of women-the very place, the body; the very relations, heterosexual; the
very activities, intercourse and reproduction; and the very feelings, intimate-form
the core of what is covered by privacy doctrine. From this perspective, the legal
concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and
women's exploited labor . . . . This right to privacy is a right of men "to be let
alone" to oppress women one at a time.

No wonder Professor MacKinnon cries that "the family legitimizes
violence to women and calls that civilization."
MacKinnon's hysteria might be understandable if her statistics
were trustworthy, but in fact they are suspect. Her avalanche of
footnotes notwithstanding, MacKinnon gets most of her figures
from a single source-a survey by Diana Russell of 930 San Francisco households. Russell maintains that 44% of the females in
these households had been raped or attacked with intent to rape,
and that 14% of the married women reported being raped by their
husbands. One may judge the reliability of these numbers by recalling that in 1976 Russell convened a tribunal on "crimes against
women" modelled on the Nuremberg trials. Russell's sexual assault
figure was "produced at my [Professor MacKinnon's] request from
[the same] random sample." Sexual assault was defined to cover
"all the forms of rape or other sexual abuse or harassment surveyed,
noncontact as well as contact, from gang rape by strangers to obscene phone calls [to] unwanted sexual advances on the street."
Not long ago a man attempted to strike up a conversation with my
wife as she was browsing at a bookstall: chalk up another sexual
assault!' 5
13. There is one ray of hope: Professor MacKinnon reports being hissed at upon mak·
ing this statement during a lecture at the Harvard University Law School.
14. MacKinnon reminds us that, "Sexual intercourse [is] still the most common cause
of pregnancy."
15. The statistic about prostitution comes from Griffin, Wives, Hookers and the Law,
STUDENT LAWYER, Jan. 1982, at 18.
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Now one might be tempted to attribute all this rape to men
wanting sex more than women wish to give it to them, but for Professor MacKinnon this is at best a half-truth. To be sure, women
dislike sex with men; MacKinnon's paradigm of sex as experienced
by women is the bored prostitute faking pleasure. (She reluctantly
allows that some women do enjoy sex with men, but only because
sex is degrading and these women have learned to enjoy degradation.) Yet MacKinnon also appears to believe that men don't like
sex very much, either. They certainly have no innate desire for it:
Desire ... is taken for a natural essence or presocial impetus but it is actually
created by the social relations, the hierarchical relations in question. This process
creates the social beings we know as women and men.

Under patriarchy, dominance is "erotized" (or "eroticized").t6
What men really want is control over women, and the penis is their
cattle prod:
I think that when men sexually harass women it expresses male control over sexual
access to us. It doesn't mean they all want to fuck us, they just want to hurt us,
dominate us, and control us, and that is fucking us.

In Professor MacKinnon's terminology, men don't oppress women
in order to fuck them; they fuck women in order to oppress them.
Quite apart from MacKinnon's evident unfamiliarity with normal human beings, there is a logical problem here. Obviously, a
stimulus not unconditionally arousing becomes "eroticized" by association with a stimulus that is unconditionally arousing. A nightgown is "eroticized" for a man by its association with his wife.
Therefore, if there are no unconditional arousers, if all desire is "socially constructed," no stimuli can be conditionally arousing. If sex
is not sexy, where is anything else to get its sexiness from?
Professor MacKinnon's answer, in case you have not guessed,
is pornography. Before turning to that topic, however, it is important to emphasize the extremism of her denial of innate determinants of relations between the sexes. At several points she seems to
deny even innate physical differences between men and women; at
any rate, she clearly asserts that, absent domination, nobody would
notice whatever differences there are:
Differences between the sexes do descriptively exist: being a doormat is definitely
different from being a man .... Differences are inequality's post-hoc excuse ... , the
distinctions that perception is socially organized to notice because inequality gives
them consequences for social power.
Gender might not even code as difference, might not mean distinction epistemologically, were it not for its consequences for social power.
16.

She equates "this erotization of dominance and submission" with heterosexuality.
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[G)ender is an inequality first, constructed as socially relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality in place.
Another way to say that is, there would be no such thing as what we know as the
sex difference ... were it not for male dominance. Sometimes people ask me "Does
that mean you think there's no difference between women and men?" The only way
I know how to answer that is: of course there is; the difference is that men have
power and women do not.l7

Professor MacKinnon again faces a logical dilemma. If "male" is
"a social and political concept, not a biological concept," how do
men know whom to oppress before their victims have actually been
oppressed and thereby become female? How, indeed, does a man
know he is one of the lucky oppressors before he has begun to do
any oppressing and thereby become male? Not by looking between
his legs, since "epistemologically, gender is socially controlled."
Unless Professor MacKinnon believes that penis and vagina are illusions fostered by dominance and submission, she must be saying
that by coincidence most of the oppressors in every society happen
to possess penises, and for this purely fortuitous reason possession
of a penis is widely thought to reveal something about the kind of
person that the possessor is. It is quite a coincidence, and one
which leaves unexplained why the human race divided itself into
dominators and submittors in the first place. Where did the "social
construct" come from that enabled men to establish all the social
constructs?
Viewing male dominance as the organizing principle of society,
Professor MacKinnon is quick to scorn the spurious sexual equality
offered by civil rights legislation. Purportedly sex-neutral standards
are always advantageous to men because male "experiences and obsessions define merit." As one might suspect, she has quite a bit
more trouble explaining why affirmative action rules that favor
women over men also perpetuate male dominance. She has so
much trouble, in fact, that she resorts to a variant of refutation by
explicit statement, namely explicit statement followed by obscure
irrelevancy:
Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule
is simply the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is
the referent for both. Think about it like those anatomy models in medical school.
A male body is the human body; all those extra things women have are studied in
ob/gyn. It truly is a situation in which more is less.

The same technique assists in addressing another unavoidable
problem for advocates of sex equality: does equality entail female
17.

This is an excellent example of refutation by explicit statement.
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conscription, and would the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
mandate it? She answers:
Sometimes I see this as a dialogue between women in the afterlife. The feminist
says to the soldier, "We fought for your equality." The soldier says to the feminist,
"oh, no, we fought for your equality."

Yes, but does sex equality entail female conscription, and would the
ERA require it?
But here is an amazing thing. After rejecting the institutions of
patriarchy and exposing affirmative action for women as another
patriarchal plot, MacKinnon goes ahead and endorses numerical
goals anyway. She lauds the Supreme Court's approval of legislation "to remove barriers to economic advancement and political
and social integration that have historically plagued ... women."
Although "feminism means to transform the meaning of athletics,
of sport itself," nonetheless "Title IX has been extremely important" for facilitating girls-only teams which exclude athletically superior boys. Legal careers impose male standards on women, and
"the real feminist issue is not whether biological females hold positions of power," yet "it is utterly essential that women be there."
Consistency gets short shrift when it gets in the way of discrimination against men.
As previously mentioned, Professor MacKinnon's primum mobile, the organizing principle "central to the institution of male
dominance," is pornography. Despite her inability to explain how
pictures of submissive women could arouse anyone not already
aroused by female submissiveness, or why patriarchy antedates and
extends beyond pornography,'s she endows pornography with nearomnipotence. Pornography, along with rape and prostitution, "institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy"; it "conditions
male orgasm to female subordination"; it "target[s] survivors" of
rape and domestic battering; it "is used to break women, to train
women to sexual submission, to season women, to terrorize women,
and to silence their dissent." And so on for 150 pages.
While one expects this philippic to end with a call for drawing
and quartering-or perhaps some more fitting dismemberment-of
those involved with pornography, Professor MacKinnon merely
urges that pornography be made illegal. Since pornography liter18. She explicitly states the latter objection. Among the ensuing obscure irrelevancies
are anti-Semitism before the Third Reich and white racism where there is no Ku Klux Klan.
The discussion then shifts to whether anti-Semitism is worth fighting, Nazis or no Nazis, with
the implicit equation of tolerance for pornography and tolerance for anti-Semitism. Her examples, however, actually underscore the force of the objection: since anti-Semitism has existed without Nazis, Nazism cannot be necessary for anti-Semitism-just as pornography
cannot be necessary for male dominance.
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ally "undermines sex equality," it violates women's civil rights, and
traffic in pornography should create the same civil liability as any
other Title VII violation. Unfortunately, "first amendment fetishists" have impeded legal reform. MacKinnon is particularly exasperated by a federal court's rejection of anti-pornography legislation
that she helped draft for the City of Minneapolis, a holding summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. She bitterly contrasts the situation in the U.S. with that in Nicaragua, where it is illegal to "use
women as sexual or commercial objects." Her discussion of the
Sexual Politics of the First Amendment ends with the reminder that
"serious movements for human freedom" never tolerate "the socalled speech of the other side." An interesting sentiment from a
woman who taught Constitutional Law at Minnesota Law School,
was selected as a distinguished guest lecturer on civil liberty at
Harvard Law, and was chosen to be a visiting professor at Chicago
Law and next year Yale Law.
Given the length of her harangue, it is curious that Professor
MacKinnon never gets around to mentioning just what the courts
found objectionable about the feminist pornography ordinance.
The sticking point, in fact, was its language banning "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in words or pictures."J9 One need come nowhere near the more difficult free
speech (and pornography) issues to agree with the courts that, contrary to the first amendment's clear purpose of forbidding government sanction of opinions, this language would establish an official,
approved view of women.
If pornography is an idea, what do we do with works of art and
literature that express evil ideas? Picasso's Tauromachea drawings
certainly run afoul of Professor MacKinnon's proscriptions. So
might the character of Stanley Kowalski in A Streetcar Named Desire. One need not look even this far for hard cases: ironically, the
most popular literary genre that would be vulnerable to MacKinnon's ordinance is the soft-core "bodice-ripper" paperback that
bores men but titillates millions of women. In the typical bodiceripper, a handsome rake-a renegade nobleman, a riverboat gambler, a pirate-enters a woman's life and takes her, ignoring her
19. The cited condition is necessary but not sufficient; it only becomes sufficient when
adjoined to one or more of several further conditions, including the representation of women
in "postures of sexual submission," or in ways which "reduce" them to their breasts and
vaginas. A representation is also considered pornographic if it uses "men, children or
transsexuals in the place of women." So even representations which on Professor MacKinnon's grounds should be conceived as conditioning an ideology of male (or children's or
transsexual's) subordination turn out to be designed to subordinate women. One is reminded
of the paranoid's reply, when it is pointed out to him that there seems to be nobody plotting
against him, "Ah, that just shows how cleverly they're plotting."
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objections. She resists, but her body betrays her. She enjoys it in
fairly explicit terms. After many adventures in exotic settings, they
marry.2o
As the philsopher Christopher Boorse has observed, art raises
logical questions as well. Do words or pictures perform actions,
like subordinating women and reducing them to their breasts and
vaginas?21 Does a film of a couple climaxing in the missionary position advocate the missionary position, or espouse the general thesis
that most women are more likely to climax when the man is on top?
And what of books which explicitly defend the subordination of women? Perhaps it is not fully realized that ideational definitions of
pornography threaten the literal expression of ideas. Many students
of human behavior, most notably Freud, have held that women are
happier when they submit sexually to men. The sociologist Steven
Goldberg argues in The Inevitability of Patriarchy that male dominance is biologically inevitable, and counsels acceptance of that reality. My own Feminism and Freedom maintains that male
dominance can only be prevented (and then just temporarily and
locally) by the machinery of a totalitarian state. To develop these
positions, it is sometimes necessary to discuss orgasm, clitoral massage, penile penetration of the vagina and other sexual matters in
explicit detail. So far as I can tell, publication of these works would
be illegal in Professor MacKinnon's world. It is no accident, as a
Marxist would say, that she is a Marxist-albeit an anti-heterosexual Marxist.
To the limited extent that MacKinnon's rage has an intellectual basis, it rests on a confusion between a representation of a thing
and a thing itself. She repeatedly describes pornography as something done to women, rather than pictures or descriptions of actions
done to notional women. Pornography for MacKinnon is not fantasy "but sexual reality: the level of reality on which sex itself
largely operates." It is no wonder that she complains that you can
be legally liable for destroying a cup, a physical object, if it is someone's property, but you aren't liable for destroying women by making a pornographic movie. She is so obsessively enraged at male
sexual desire that she is functionally unaware that men reading
20. Evolutionary biology sees the differences between male and female sexual fantasies
as an extension of adaptive differences in sexual behavior. Since a man does best (from his
genes' point of view) by mating with as many women as possible, he is strongly cued by sheer
receptiveness. Since a woman does best (from her genes' point of view) by mating with a man
both strong enough to protect her and her offspring and devoted enough not to leave her, she
is strongly cued by males who might "sweep her off her feet." Were I to be more explicit
about the sexually differentiated mechanisms of arousal, this paragraph would have to be
censored under MacKinnon's criteria.
21. See supra note 19.
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Penthouse are imagining themselves having intercourse, and not really having intercourse at all.
Despite the many passages I have quoted from Feminism Unmodified, I fear I may not have adequately recreated the aura of
dementia radiating from this book. I have long suspected that feminism has gotten as far as it has because people simply do not read
the ipsissimae dixeunt of feminists themselves. So I will close by
leaving the reader with the quintessence of the MacKinnon
sensibility:
To be about to be raped is to be gender female in the process of going about life as
usual.
[T]he fight over a definition of obscenity is a fight among men over the best means
to guarantee male power as a system.

And now my favorite (no easy decision). As the reader ponders it,
he might reflect that the book from which it is drawn was lauded in
the New York Times, and that feminism, unmodified, continues to
be embraced by a wide segment of the legal, academic, and intellectual community:
Playboy's articles push their views, including their views of the First Amendment,

in an expressly sexualized context, and at the same time those articles serve to legitimize what their pictures do to women. Masturbating over the positions taken by
the women's bodies associates male orgasm with the positions expressed in the articles. Ever wonder why men are so passionate about the First Amendment? . . . I
must also say that the First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through years
of absolutist writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particular. You know
those superheated articles where freedom of speech is extolled and its imminent
repression is invoked. Behaviorally, Playboy's consumers are reading about the
First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, masturbating to the women.

CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL,
SECOND EDITION. By David E. Engdahl.t St. Paul, Mn.:
West Publishing Co. 1987. Pp. xlv, 411. Paper, $10.95.

Daniel 0. Conkle 2
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